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Abstract
Security assurance is a property that ensures that the application code behaves consistently with the access
control policy speciﬁed at the design level. Security assurance proofs are valid as long as software engi-
neers do not modify the generated code. This assumption does not hold in Round-Trip Engineering, since
programmers may modify the generated code and the models are automatically re-generated. This paper
proposes a round-trip engineering approach for access control that preserves security assurance both when
generating code from models and vice versa. The approach is to extend programming languages’ typing
mechanisms with additional rules that ensure consistency between models and code, even when code is
arbitrarily modiﬁed by programmers. This paper presents a formal description of the solution and an initial
sketch of the required proofs of correctness. Ongoing work is the development of a prototype to automate
most of the process and its validation in a case study.
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1 Introduction
Access control is deﬁned as: “Limiting access to information system resources only
to authorized users, programs, processes or other systems” [49]. Access control is an
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essential component to ensure that sensitive information is secure, uncorrupted, and
available. Therefore, it is very important that access control becomes a ﬁrst-class
concern of the software development process. Overall, the general problem that
motivates this research is: the need of a process for secure software engineering
that incorporates access control at every stage in the software development process
[39].
Previous work of the authors in this area include a framework for access control
modeling and secure code generation [40,38]. At the design level, the framework
proposes several extensions to UML to deﬁne access control policies based in Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) [41], Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [10], and
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [18]. The focus is to separate access control
concerns from other requirements in the design models. At the code level the authors
have developed two independent works. One of them is CincoSecurity, a security
module based in ﬁne-grained roles and security proﬁles for Java EE applications
[24]. The other work is a set of object-oriented strategies to preserve separation of
access control concerns from other requirements [38].
At the code level, a very important issue is security assurance [40]. In the
context of this research, security assurance means to ensure that the code correctly
implements the access control from the design. A correct implementation means
that the application behaves exactly as the policy intends, allowing subjects to
access application resources only if allowed by the rules in the access control design.
In support of security assurance, previous work of the authors include a process
to formally prove consistency between access control policies and the code that
implements them [40]. The above proofs provide security assurance based in the
assumption that models are the main development artifact. This premise is valid
in some Model-Driven approaches, where designers create an access control policy,
then code is automatically generated to implement the policy and the code is not
further modiﬁed [29].
However, the above assumption does not hold in Round-Trip Engineering (RTE)
[29]. In RTE, after the code is generated from models, programmers may modify it.
Models can be automatically re-generated from the modiﬁed code using a reverse
engineering process. This situation may break the consistency between access con-
trol models and their implementation in code, since some code conﬁgurations may
not map to valid access control models.
To address the above problem, this paper proposes an approach to preserve
consistency between access control models and code in a round-trip environment.
Figure 1 describes the approach. A model of the application is created at the design
level, which includes an access control model. Code is automatically generated to
implement the design. Programmers can modify the generated code and models can
be automatically re-generated using reverse engineering. To ensure that consistency
between access control policies and code is not broken, the approach is to extend
the typing rules of the programming language. These additional rules restrict the
allowed modiﬁcations to the code in such a way that, when reverse engineering is
performed, only valid access control models are generated.
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Figure 1. Proposed approach for round-trip security assurance.
The remainder of this paper details the approach. Section 2 explains the essential
concepts of the CincoSecurity module [24], which will be used as a case study to
illustrate the approach. Section 3 details the proposed approach, formalizing the
essential concepts and theorems for security assurance. Section 4 uses a case study
based in the CincoSecurity module to develop round-trip security assurance proofs.
Section 5 describes some related work. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 CincoSecurity Module
To illustrate the proposed approach, this paper uses the CincoSecurity module as a
case study to prove round-trip security assurance. The CincoSecurity module was
developed by one of the authors [24] to provide access control enforcement for Java
EE applications. CincoSecurity extends the standard access control capabilities
of Java EE [47] with Seam [48], providing: enhanced use case implementation and
modularization, ﬁne-grained roles, resource protection, security proﬁles, session and
authentication services.
Fine-grained roles will be explained in this section, since this is the main concept
utilized in this paper for the case study. Roles usually have associated the privilege
to access a speciﬁc session bean, and to execute operations over session beans. In
CincoSecurity, the role name to access a speciﬁc session bean is the same as the
name of the bean. Fine-grained roles only have one privilege, to execute a method
of a session bean. The role name to access an operation of the session bean has
the following format: “role”_“method”, where “role” is the name of the coarse-
grained role to access a session bean and “method” is the name of the corresponding
operation.
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To protect access to resources, CincoSecurity utilizes annotations. To constrain
access to session beans, the approach is to add to the bean class an annotation of
the form
@Restrict("#{s:hasRole(’role’)}")
Where role corresponds to the role to access the session bean and it has the same
name as the session bean.
To constrain access to operations in the session beans, the approach is to the
bean methods, annotations of the form
@Restrict("#{s:hasRole(’role_operation’)}")
Where role corresponds to the role to access the session bean and operation
corresponds to the name of the method. When the code is executed in a Java EE
application server, the server interprets the above annotations and automatically
controls access to the annotated resources. In case an access is restricted, the
server throws an exception, which can be managed by programmers to introduce
the adequate behavior.
CincoSecurity also adds code to protect JSF pages, but it will not be further
detailed, since it is not used in the case study.
3 Preserving Consistency between Access Control Poli-
cies and Code
In Round-Trip Engineering, designers create models of the system and, using a code
generator, automatically create the code that implements those models. In addition,
programmers can modify the generated code. Finally, a reverse engineering process
parses the modiﬁed source code to re-generate the models [29].
In a regular round-trip environment, this process may work without further
modiﬁcations. For instance, assume that designers model an application structure
using a UML class diagram and its behavior with a sequence diagram [34]. Code can
be easily generated to implement these diagrams. Further modiﬁcations to the code
can be reverse-engineered into models using standard CASE tools [29]. Although
some information may be lost in the process, such as UML class associations, ad-
ditional data can be included into the code to preserve that information after the
reverse-engineering process [26]. Overall, as long as there is full correspondence
between elements in models and code, one can assume that the round-trip process
will preserve consistency between both domains.
However, some application concerns introduce challenges to round-trip engi-
neering. Particularly, for access control there may be some code that may break
consistency with access control requirements after the reverse engineering process.
To better understand this issue, consider a courseware application that includes a
CourseManagement role with permissions over method getSyllabus that retrieves the
syllabus of a course. Assume that code is generated to implement the access control
model using Java EE with Seam [48]. The generated code will include annotations
of the form
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@Restrict("#{s:hasRole(’CourseManagement’)}")
in all of the methods that are authorized for course management. There are no
mechanisms to protect those annotations from changes that programmers could
make, e.g., changing role names, deﬁning new roles, etc. A more complex case oc-
curs when using CincoSecurity [24] to implement security. For each method granted
to CourseManagement, a ﬁne-grained role must be created with a name of the form
“role”_”operation”. For the above example, the annotation in the getSyllabus
method would be of the form
@Restrict("#{s:hasRole(’CourseManagement_getSyllabus’)}").
In this case, not only the annotations are unprotected from programmers’ changes.
There is also the risk that the modiﬁed code would not yield a valid model when
performing reverse engineering. For instance, if programmers change the operation
in the annotation to Course_getSyllabi, the generated model would be invalid,
since the method getSyllabi may not exist and the annotation would be deﬁned
over a method with a diﬀerent name (getSyllabus). Overall, there is no guaran-
tee that modiﬁcations to code would comply with previously deﬁned access control
requirements.
To address this problem, the proposed approach is to enhance the typing rules
of the target programming language to include automatic checkings for any rule
imposed by the access control model and the security library. These typing rules
should only allow modiﬁcations to the code that yield valid access control models.
From these extended typing rules, one can provide security assurance in a round-
trip environment, by formally proving that the generated code and models satisfy
certain consistency properties.
Round-Trip Security Assurance
In a round-trip engineering project, there are several essential elements: models
that represent the system, mappings from models to code (code generators), code
that implement the models, and reverse engineering mappings (to generate models
from code). In addition, models have a set of constraints that assure that the model
is valid, which are usually veriﬁed by the CASE tool utilized to create them. For
instance, a constraint over a UML class model is that there must not be two methods
with the same name and parameters in a class.
Similarly, the code has a set of typing rules that ensure that the code is well-
formed, and they are usually veriﬁed at compile-time. For instance, a typing rule in
a Java program is that the types of the variables passed as arguments to a method
call must match the types of the parameters of the corresponding method.
For the remainder of this paper, a round-trip scheme refers to a collection of
four elements: constraints over models, code generation mappings, typing rules, and
reverse engineering mappings. The essential idea of round-trip security assurance
is to preserve consistency between access control models and code that are being
developed using a given round-trip scheme. More formally, round-trip security
assurance is achieved through a proof of correctness, where a round-trip scheme is
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correct if: (a) the generated code correctly implements the access control policy and
(b) the code, whether it is modiﬁed or not, can yield a valid access control model
after the reverse engineering process.
Deﬁnitions 3.1 to 3.6 formalize models, code and the components of a round-trip
scheme:
Deﬁnition 3.1 M is the set of all possible models of applications, I is the set of
all possible implementations in a programming language.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Given a set of constraints K, a model m ∈ M is valid over K if m
satisﬁes all of the constraints in K.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Given a set of typing rules T , an implementation I ∈ I is well-typed
if I satisﬁes all of the typing rules in T .
Deﬁnition 3.4 Given a model m ∈ M of the application and an implementation
I∈I, Code Generation is a function g : M → I that maps models to their corre-
sponding implementations.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Reverse Engineering is a function re : I → M that maps imple-
mentations to models.
Deﬁnition 3.6 A Round-Trip Scheme is a tuple 〈g, re,K, T 〉, where g : M → I is
a code generation function, re : I → M is a reverse engineering function, K is a
set of constraints to determine validity of models, and T is a set of typing rules for
implementations.
The above deﬁnitions are purposefully abstract. No details about the models and
code are given, since they are project-dependent. Using these deﬁnitions, Theorem
3.7 formalizes round-trip security assurance as a proof of correctness, which states
that a round-trip scheme is correct if the code generated from a valid model is
well-typed, and the models generated from a well-typed code are valid.
Theorem 3.7 Given a set K of constraints, a set T of typing rules, a set Mvalid ⊆
M of all valid models under K, and a set Iok ⊆ I of all well-typed implementations
over T. A round-trip scheme 〈g, re,K, T 〉 is correct if g(m) is well-typed under T ,
for all m ∈ Mvalid and re(I) is valid under K, for all I ∈ Iok.
4 Proof of Correctness for CincoSecurity
To illustrate the use of deﬁnitions of Section 3, this section utilizes the CincoSecurity
module as a case study, formalizing a simple application model with access control,
mappings to and from code that use CincoSecurity, constraints over models, and
typing rules over programs. Then it uses all of these deﬁnitions to prove security
assurance over a given round-trip scheme.
Deﬁnitions 4.1 to 4.6 formalize with more details the components of a model (see
Deﬁnition 3.1). For simplicity, a model in this case study includes only operations
(methods) of the application, and the access control policy, which indicates which
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operations can access each role. No information about classes are explicitly included,
since that would make the deﬁnitions and proofs unnecessarily complex for this
example.
Deﬁnition 4.1 R is the set of roles that interact with an application.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Op is the set of operations (methods) of an application.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Obj is the set of objects of an application
Deﬁnition 4.4 An Authorization is a tuple 〈r, op〉, where r ∈ R is a role that inter-
acts with the application and op ∈ Op is an operation (method) of the application
that the role can execute.
Deﬁnition 4.5 An Access Control Policy P is a set of authorizations.
Deﬁnition 4.6 A Model m ∈ M of an application is a tuple 〈Op, P 〉, where Op is
the set of operations (methods) of the application and P is the access control policy
of the application.
Deﬁnitions 4.7 to 4.9 describe the essential elements of the code that implement
the models. For simplicity, only the essential elements of Java EE are included:
operation (method) implementations and annotations. Annotations are represented
as a tuple 〈a, op, v〉, which is equivalent to a Java annotation of the form @a(v) over
a method op. Annotations may contain any object inside (v), but for the purposes of
this case study, we will put strings inside annotations. To adequately interpret the
strings within annotations, Deﬁnition 4.9 includes an auxiliary function to obtain
the string representation of a role or an operation.
Deﬁnition 4.7 An Annotation is a tuple 〈a, op, v〉, where a is the annotation name,
op is the operation being annotated, and v is an object v ∈ Obj.
Deﬁnition 4.8 An Application Implementation I ∈ I is a tuple 〈IOp,A〉, where
IOp is a set of operation implementations, tuples of the form 〈op, t〉, where op is an
operation, and t is its implementation in the programming language. A is a set of
annotations over operations in IOp.
Deﬁnition 4.9 The string representation of an element, denoted [e] = s is a map-
ping [ ] : E → String from a model or implementation element e ∈ E to its corre-
sponding string representation s ∈ String, String ⊆ Obj. In an abuse of notation,
e can be either a role or an operation E = Op ∪ R.
Deﬁnition 4.10 speciﬁes a round-trip scheme that uses the CincoSecurity module.
The code generation function takes as input a model with operations and a policy,
and outputs an implementation with operations and Restrict annotations (see
Section 2 for more details about these annotations). For simplicity, the text inside
Restrict annotations only has the essential information of the role and operation.
All of the additional syntax is removed to reduce the complexity of the example.
Analogously, the reverse engineering mapping takes as input an implementation
using CincoSecurity and outputs a model.
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Models must satisfy a set Kcs of constraints, which ensure that all of the per-
missions in an access control policy reference existing operations in the model.
Similarly, the implementation must satisfy three typing rules. The ﬁrst two are
abstractions of typing rules found in Java: Rule (6) indicates that there must not
be duplicate operations in the implementation, Rule (7) indicates that annotations
must reference an existing operation (method) in the implementation. Rule (8) rep-
resents an extension to the typing rules of Java, to ensure that any implementation
using CincoSecurity yields only valid models when performing reverse engineering.
This rule indicates that the string of every Restrict annotation must include a
role name and and operation name, and the operation name must correspond to
the operation referenced by the annotation.
Deﬁnition 4.10 The CincoSecurity round-trip scheme is a tuple
〈gcs, rcs,Kcs, Tcs〉, where gcs is a code generation function
gcs(〈Op, P 〉) = 〈IOpcs, Acs〉, such that
IOpcs =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
〈op, t〉 | op ∈ Op
∧¬∃〈op, t´〉 ∈ IOp s.t t 
= t´
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(1)
Acs = {〈Restrict, op, [r]_[op]〉 | 〈r, op〉 ∈ P}(2)
recs is a reverse engineering mapping recs(〈IOp,A〉) = 〈Op, P 〉, such that
Opcs = {op | 〈op, t〉 ∈ IOp}(3)
Pcs = {〈r, op〉 | 〈Restrict, op, [r]_[op]〉 ∈ A}(4)
Kcs is a set of constraints for the validity of models
Kcs = {∀〈r, op〉 ∈ Pcs op ∈ Opcs}(5)
and Tcs is a set of typing rules Tcs = {tr1, tr2, tr3}, where
tr1 = ∀〈op, t〉 ∈ IOp ¬∃〈op, t´〉 ∈ IOpcs, t 
= t´(6)
tr2 = ∀〈a, op, v〉 ∈ Acs ∃〈op, t〉 ∈ IOpcs(7)
tr3 = ∀〈Restrict, opi, [r]_[opj ]〉 ∈ Acs, opi = opj(8)
To provide security assurance for the above round-trip scheme, one must prove
that it is correct. Theorem 4.13 is the application of Theorem 3.7 to prove correct-
ness of the scheme of Deﬁnition 4.10. To facilitate the proof, Lemma 4.11 proves
correctness for the code generation mapping gcs and Lemma 4.12 proves correctness
of the reverse engineering function recs.
Lemma 4.11 For all valid models m = 〈Op, P 〉 under Kcs, gcs(m) is well-typed
under Tcs.
Proof To prove that gcs(m) is well-typed under Tcs, one must ﬁrst prove that
gcs(m) satisﬁes each of the constraints in Tcs.
• From (1), IOpcs is the set of tuples of the form 〈op, t〉, where there are no two
tuples having the same op. Therefore, Rule (6) of Tcs is satisﬁed.
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• From (2), Acs is a set of tuples of the form 〈Restrict, op, [r]_[op]〉, where 〈r, op〉
belongs to the policy P of m. Since m satisﬁes the constraint of Kcs (5), all of
the operations op in P also belong to Op. Therefore, for all op in the generated
annotations 〈Restrict, op, [r]_[op]〉, op ∈ IOpcs, which satisﬁes Rule (7) of Tcs.
• From (6), (5), and (2), it follows that Rule (8) is also satisﬁed. 
Lemma 4.12 For all well-typed implementations I ∈ I under Tcs, recs(I) is a valid
model under Kcs.
Proof To prove the validity of recs(I), one must prove that recs(I) satisﬁes the
constraints in Kcs (5). From (3), there is an operation op ∈ Opcs for each 〈op, t〉 ∈
IOp. Since I satisﬁes (7) and (8), and from (4), it follows that all operations op in
Pcs also belong to Opcs, which satisﬁes the constraint in Kcs. 
Theorem 4.13 The CincoSecurity round-trip scheme 〈gecs, rcs,Kcs, Tcs〉 is correct.
Proof Straightforward from Theorem 3.7, and Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12. 
5 Related Work
There are several works that incorporate access control into software. At the design
level, UMLSec [28], AuthUML[6], Doan et al. [17] propose extensions to UML to
model diﬀerent aspects of RBAC, MAC, or both. Song et al. [45] and Mouheb et al.
[32] deﬁne aspect-oriented mechanisms to transform software models to incorporate
access control requirements. None of these works solve the problem of secure code
generation from model speciﬁcations.
At the code level, there are also several works. Farias [21], Evans et al.[20],
Pandey et al. [37], and Erlingsson et al. [19] provide the compilation process in
diverse platforms to incorporate security precondition checking. Similarly, Mourad
et al. [33], Alhadidi et al. [7], Bodkin [11], Dantas [14], De Win [15], Huang et
al. [27], Shlowikowski et al. [44], Sewe [43] and Viega et al. [50], use aspect-
oriented programming to restrict access based in permissions. Frameworks, such as
JPA Security[2], FleXive [1], and Seam [48] provide access control mechanisms in
Java EE. Centonze et al. [12] and Fischer et al. [22] provide approaches to verify
consistency of access control policies in Java EE. None of these approaches provide
a traceable link from design models in RBAC, MAC, or DAC to code or vice versa.
Most of the above work focus either in models or code, but not both. The only
exception is the work of Basin et al. [9] that provides mechanisms to translate
models into code and conﬁguration ﬁles. However, their work does not provide any
reverse engineering mechanism.
The problem of consistency between models and code can be generalized to
the problem of bidirectional transformations [13]. The Query-View Transformation
language (QVT) [36] provides support for bidirectional transformations, however,
as Stevens et al point out [46], there are several issues in the QVT speciﬁcation
that limits its applicability for model synchronization. Diskin et al [16] provide
a formal algebraic speciﬁcation for bidirectional transformations, with a focus in
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model synchronization. Diskin’s work, although it is mainly theoretical, it provides
some useful artifacts for Round-Trip Engineering. A similar work is presented by
Foster et al [23], with a focus in bidirectional tree transformation. Hermann et al
[25] proposes an approach for model synchronization based in triple-graph grammars
(TGG) [42]. Similarly, Anjorin et al [8] synchronizes models and code using triple-
graph grammars, and maps grammars to meta-models. Anjorin et al approach
uses TGG at the model level and the meta-model TGG is automatically derived
from the TGG of the model-level. However, this relies on the assumption that the
abstract syntax tree meta-model is ﬁxed [8]. This assumption is not valid in an
MDE environment, where it is necessary to generate code for multiple languages
and platforms [30,31,35].
Finally, there are several tools that support code generation and reverse engi-
neering for general-purpose models [3,4,5]. To the best of our knowledge, there are
no tools that explicitly address access control requirements in Round-Trip Engi-
neering.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper proposed a formal proof of correctness for access control models and
code in a round-trip environment. Its applicability was illustrated in a case study
using the CincoSecurity module. From the case study one can infer that the pro-
posed approach is applicable for code generation and reverse engineering mappings,
provided that models and code are suﬃciently abstracted.
As such, this is a ﬁrst step towards a full-featured round-trip engineering mech-
anism for access control. Ongoing work is to develop a proof-of-concept prototype
that implements all of the proposed formalisms, to automatically check the extended
typing rules of the access control code. Future work includes automatically deriving
the extended typing rules from the constraints in the model and the code generation
mappings and verifying correctness. This will require to explore proof assistants and
constraint checking tools, which may provide the basis for such application.
The future results of this work are expected to beneﬁt code generation and
reverse engineering by improving safety in the deﬁnition of round-trip engineering
schemes. A reduction in the loss of information in the mappings is expected, to
comply with the correctness conditions. Moreover, since the extended typing rules
are associated to code, they can be incorporated into standard IDE tools. Automatic
typing rule veriﬁcations in these tools are expected to reduce the probability of
errors, thus improving the overall round-trip process.
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